We give a unified account of classical secret-sharing goals from a modern cryptographic vantage. Our treatment encompasses perfect, statistical, and computational secret sharing; static and dynamic adversaries; schemes with or without robustness; schemes where a participant recovers the secret and those where an external party does so. We then show that Krawczyk's 1993 protocol for robust computational secret sharing (RCSS) need not be secure, even in the random-oracle model and for threshold schemes, if the encryption primitive it uses satisfies only one-query indistinguishability (ind1), the only notion Krawczyk defines. Nonetheless, we show that the protocol is secure (in the random-oracle model, for threshold schemes) if the encryption scheme also satisfies one-query key-unrecoverability (key1). Since practical encryption schemes are ind1+key1 secure, our result effectively shows that Krawczyk's RCSS protocol is sound (in the random-oracle model, for threshold schemes). Finally, we prove the security for a variant of Krawczyk's protocol, in the standard model and for arbitrary access structures, assuming ind1 encryption and a statisticallyhiding, weakly-binding commitment scheme.
INTRODUCTION
Work on classical secret-sharing tends to follow the traditions and sensibilities of information theory, combinatorics, or coding theory, not those of modern provable-security cryptography.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Consider, for example, that the word adversary does not appear in the most widely cited survey of secret sharing [43] -but the word information appears some 50 times. Or consider that it was nearly 15 years after the invention of secret sharing by Blakley and Shamir [9, 41] until somebody, Krawczyk [30] , made more than passing mention of the fact that there is a natural and useful complexity-theoretic setting for this problem. Even then, most subsequent work has ignored this "computational" setting.
In this paper we will recast classical secret-sharing in the tradition of provable-security cryptography. We will then use the freshened foundations to carry out a provable-security analysis of a wellknown, useful, and formerly unanalyzed secret-sharing scheme. Before describing these contributions, we give some needed background.
BACKGROUND. In a robust computational secret sharing (RCSS) protocol, a dealer, assumed to be honest, breaks a secret X into shares X1, . . . , Xn and distributes them to n players in such a way that an unauthorized set of players learns nothing about X from their shares, yet an authorized set of players will reconstruct X, despite some players providing bogus shares, if and only if X was shared. Both guarantees are computational, not informationtheoretic. So RCSS relaxes the perfect secret-sharing goal of Shamir [41] in one dimension (computational privacy instead of information-theoretic privacy) and strengthens it in another (reconstructability in the face of incorrect shares, not just missing ones).
The RCSS goal, as well as a candidate solution, was invented by Krawczyk [30] . But Krawczyk provides no proofs or formal definitions for RCSS. Indeed his focus was not RCSS but CSS, computational secret-sharing, where recovery is for correct-or-missing shares. The CSS goal had been earlier mentioned by Karnin, Greene, and Hellman [29] , who also consider the variant where cheating must be detected, not corrected. Robustness (recoverability despite some wrong shares) had already been studied in the information-theoretic setting by McEliece and Sarwate [34] and by Tompa and Woll [44] .
Krawczyk's reason to look at CSS and RCSS was to reduce the size of participant shares: his mechanisms illustrate that, for threshold schemes, shares can be shorter than the secret, which is impossible in the information-theoretic setting [14, 29] . Krawczyk provides a CSS scheme with short shares using Rabin's idea of an information-dispersal algorithm (IDA) [38] . Robustness is then added-on using a hash-function-based technique that Krawczyk introduced in a separate paper [31] . Follow-on work to Krawczyk's paper has mostly focused on doing CSS for more general access structures [1, 13, 33, 45] .
Protocols for CSS and RCSS are powerful tools or building secure and reliable distributed information-storage systems. A user's data (perhaps a file) is broken into pieces (shares) and stored on multiple servers in such a way that protects the privacy of the user from nosy servers, yet permits recovery of the data even if some of the servers provide invalid shares (either accidentally or intentionally). In recent years, and apparently without much notice from cryptographers, such systems and architectures have emerged from places like CMU and IBM [20, 27, 32, 37, 46] . Commercial product offerings and an open-source development community have also taken root. 1 An issue of Computer magazine explained these ideas [48] . Yet all of this has happened in the absence of even a formal definition for RCSS. In short, storage systems based on RCSS protocols already exist, but embody practice getting out in front of theory. As such, one cannot answer basic questions about these systems and their protocols, questions like "what exactly does this protocol do?" or "does CBC/IV=0 encryption suffice within it?" OUR CONTRIBUTIONS. Coming at secret-sharing from a modern, provable-security angle, we make two contributions. One contribution is to revisit the basics of RCSS. We investigate the security of Krawczyk's RCSS protocol, which we call HK1. While Krawczyk made no formal definitions or claims in this regard, the only encryption-scheme security property mentioned in his paper is the indistinguishability of Encrypt K (X) and Encrypt K (X ), which we call one-query indistinguishability (ind1). Intuitively, this is all that HK1 should need, since, in the protocol, a key is used to encrypt just one message. Still, we show that HK1 is not secure under the assumption that its encryption scheme is ind1-secure, even for threshold schemes 2 and the random-oracle (RO) model [6] . Despite this, we show that HK1 is secure, for threshold schemes and in the RO model, if one assumes that the encryption scheme is ind1-secure and key1-secure, the latter being one-query key-unrecoverability. We complement this by proving ind1 + key1 to be the minimal assumption under which HK1 can be proved secure. Conventional encryption schemes are ind1-and key1-secure [3] , so one may interpret our results as saying that, in the end, HK1 is sound, at least in the case of threshold schemes. The proof of security for HK2 is complex; intuitively, the complexity arises because one must sidestep the issues that cause an ind1-based instantiation of HK1 to fail. We go on to show that making a small change to HK1-replacing its hash-function by a noninteractive statistically-hiding, weakly-binding (SHWB) commitmentscheme-fixes all identified issues: the modified protocol, HK2, becomes provably secure for an arbitrary access structure, in the standard model, assuming just ind1-secure encryption. Our results are summarized in Figure 1 . To make the above results possible, we need a definition for RCSS. Not wanting to formalize yet another one-off secret-sharing notion, we show how to cast a large set of secret-sharing goals into a common framework. We give concrete-security, adversary-at-thecenter definitions that encompass the perfect secret-sharing (PSS) goal of Shamir [41] ; the less-than-perfect-privacy variant by Blakley [9] ; the strengthening of PSS to robust schemes as envisioned by McEliece and Sarwate [34] ; the alternative version of robustness described by Tompa and Woll [44] ; and the relaxation of all this to the computational setting, as considered by Krawczyk [30] . Our definitions handle dynamic adversaries, apparently for the first time, and unify the information-theoretic and complexity-theoretic 1 Examples include Cleversafe Corporation and the Cleversafe open-source user community (see http://www.cleversafe.org and http://www.cleversafe.com) and Security First Corporation (see http://securityfirstcorp.com). 2 An m-out-of-n threshold scheme is a secret-sharing scheme for which any m uncorrupted players can recover the secret but smaller sets of players cannot. The set of sets of players authorized to recover the secret is the access structure for the scheme. views. Look ahead to Figure 4 for a preview of some of the secretsharing notions we encompass.
MORE ON DEFINITIONS. Classical definitions for secret-sharing ( [9, 30, 34, 41, 44] and many others) frequently assume an a priori distribution on secrets, assume it to be the uniform over a large set, elide the syntax of a secret-sharing scheme, omit mention of any adversary, and make the implicit adversary static, with no simple way to make it dynamic. The classical PSS definitions are so tailored to the perfect, information-theoretic case that there is no simple way to relax things to make a complexity-theoretic analog. Each definition is separate from each other, cut from its own cloth.
No formal definition of the RCSS goal has ever appeared. We aim to give a unified account of classical secret-sharing. To do this we define the privacy-advantage of an adversary A attacking secret-sharing scheme Π, denoted Adv priv Π (A), and we define the recoverability-advantage of an adversary B attacking a secretsharing scheme Π, denoted Adv rec Π (B), and we use these to define all notions of interest. There turn out to be four natural constraints on Adv priv Π (A) and nine natural constraints on Adv rec Π (B). Each classical secret-sharing notion shows up as one of the 36 combinations.
Our approach injects some order into the current definitional jungle of secret-sharing variants. In the process, we clarify that there have coexisted in the literature two fundamentally different notions of robustness. In the first, an uncorrupted player recovers the secret [44] ; in the second, an external party has that job [34] . What is achievable in the two settings is vastly different (eg., external-party reconstructability can accommodate fewer corrupted players). It would seem that the two forms of robustness have coexisted in the literature for some 20 years without it even having being commented on that there are two kinds of robustness. Such a gap is probably attributable to the prior absence of a unifying viewpoint.
We comment that while our definitional framework is broad, it does not encompass verifiable secret-sharing (VSS) [16] . In a VSS scheme the dealer may be dishonest; for the goals in scope in this paper, the dealer is honest. Nor do we encompass proactive secret sharing [24] , which, like VSS, has always been treated in the provable-security tradition. Our framework fails to encompass cheater detection or identification [11, 34] , where the adversary is capable of obstructing recovery but incapable of forcing the recovery of a bogus secret. In this last case, however, our framework could certainly be extended to include these notions.
AFTERWARDS. After seeing a version of our paper, Yuval Ishai suggested a new RCSS protocol that combines a CSS protocol and a digital signature scheme [25] . Our intent in this paper was not to develop or analyze any fundamentally new protocol, but to analyze an existing protocol, HK1, that is already implemented, influential, and well-known. We also look at HK2 since it is a simple extension to HK1 that helps to shed light on it. 
PRELIMINARIES
ALGORITHMS AND ADVERSARIES. When we speak of an algorithm we mean an always-halting deterministic or probabilistic algorithm, possibly with access to one or more named oracles. A probabilistic algorithm can uniformly choose a random number between 1 and i for an arbitrary positive integer i by executing a statement a ← A means to sample uniformly from it. If A is a probabilistic algorithm then x ∈ A(·) means that x occurs as an output with nonzero probability. We denote by X1 · · · Xn or X1 · · · Xn a reasonable encoding of (X1, . . . , Xn) from which the constituents are uniquely recoverable. If the lengths of each Xi is known then concatenation serves this purpose.
GAMES. We employ code-based game-playing in our proofs, as explored in [4] . In brief, a game is an always-halting program, written in code or pseudocode, that runs with an adversary. It specifies procedures Initialize, Finalize, and additional procedures (like Deal, Corrupt, and so forth), which are called oracles. In the code of a game, sets are initialized to empty and Booleans to false. The output of a game is the output of its Finalize procedure, or the output of the adversary itself if no Finalize is specified. We write 
We define two notions of security for an encryption scheme Π = (Encrypt, Decrypt): indistinguishability (formalized in the left-or-right manner) and key-recoverability. For consistent syntax with the rest of this paper, we describe both notions using games. See Figure 2 for the definitions of these games, named Ind and Key. Based on them, define the indistinguishability advantage by Adv
The notion is the same as in [3] . We let Adv key Π (A) = Pr[Key A ] be the probability that A recovers the encryption key.
An encryption scheme secure against q ≥ 2 queries in the indistinguishability sense is also secure against q − 1 queries in the key-recoverability sense. We omit the formalization and proof, which is standard. In particular, two-query indistinguishability (ind2) implies one-query key-recoverability (key1), but an encryption scheme secure in the ind1 sense need not be secure against key-recovery at all. The one-time pad is an example.
THE DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK
We break with tradition by handling information-theoretic secret-sharing neither in terms of entropy nor equality of distributions, but in a way that directly models and measures the adversary's aims. Also breaking with tradition, we directly handle dynamic adversaries.
SYNTAX. An n-party secret-sharing scheme with message space S is a pair Π = (Share, Recover). Here Share is a probabilistic algorithm that, on input S ∈ S returns the n-vector S $ ← Share(S) where each S[i] ∈ {0, 1} * and Recover is a deterministic algorithm that on input S ∈ {0, 1} * ∪ {♦} n and j ∈ [0 .. n] returns a value S ← Recover(S, j) where S ∈ S ∪ {♦}. We assume Share(S) returns ⊥ ("undefined") if S ∈ S. Let us explain the intent of the syntax. A secret-sharing scheme specifies two different algorithms. The first, Share, is used by a dealer who wants to distribute some secret S ∈ S to a group of n players, numbered 1, . . . , n. * or the distinguished value ♦. In the first case the value S[i] is the purported share of party i while in the second case the share S[i] = ♦ has been marked as missing. The party who wants to recover the shared secret now applies the algorithm Recover to the vector S and a number j ∈ [0 .. n], the number indicating the location of a share that is known to be valid. If no particular share is known valid, set j = 0 and write Recover(S) for Recover(S, 0). To make sense, one must have
The value that emerges from applying Recover will be either the recovered secret S ∈ S or the distinguished value ♦. The latter indicates that the algorithm is unable to recover the underlying secret.
PRIVACY. Let Π = (Share, Recover) be an n-party secret-sharing scheme with message space S. Let A be an adversary. We consider the privacy game Priv of Figure RECOVERABILITY. Fix an n-party secret-sharing scheme Π = (Share, Recover) with message space S. Let A be an adversary. We consider the recoverability game Rec of Figure 3 . First, initialize T ← ∅. Now run adversary A. It should first call Deal(S) for some S ∈ S. Note that Deal takes just one argument this time. The game then selects an n-vector S from Share(S). Next the adversary corrupts players. Each time it calls Corrupt(i) the game sets T ← T ∪ {i} and returns S[i]. When the adversary is done corrupting players it outputs a pair (S , j) where
The adversary is said to win if Recover(S T S T , j) = S. We measure the adversary's success by the real number Adv
. Let Rec be the class of adversaries, the recoverability adversaries, that behave as we have just described, regardless of oracle responses.
We define a set Rec♦ ⊆ Rec, the erasure adversaries. Adversary A ∈ Rec is in Rec♦ if, whenever A outputs (S , j), we have
: the adversary replaces the shares of corrupted players by ♦. Similarly, we define a set Rec1 ⊆ Rec, the recoverability-1 adversaries. Adversary A ∈ Rec is in Rec1 if, whenever A outputs (S , j), we have j > 0 and j is uncorrupted. The adversary is obliged to point to an uncorrupted player.
SECRET-SHARING DEFINITIONS. Let Π = (Share, Recover) be secret-sharing scheme and let A be a class of adversaries. We can demand Adv priv Π (A) be: PSS: zero for any privacy adversaries in A; SSS: small for any privacy adversary in A; CSS: small for any practical privacy adversary in A; or NSS: no privacy demands at all. (Letters P, S, C, and N stand for perfect, statistical, computational, and none, while SS is for secret sharing.) Similarly, we can demand Adv rec Π (A) be: PR0: zero for any erasure adversary in A; PR1: zero for any recoverability-1 adversary in A; PR2: zero for any recoverability adversary in A; SR0: small for for any erasure adversary in A; SR1: small for any recoverability-1 adversary in A; SR2: small for any recoverability adversary in A; CR0: small for any practical erasure adversary in A; CR1: small for any practical recoverability-1 adversary in A; or CR2: small for any practical recoverability adversary in A. (Letters P, S, and C are as before, and R is for robustness.) All in all there are 4 · 9 = 36 notions obtained by combining the named requirements on Adv priv Π (A) and Adv rec Π (A). We single out some of them in Figure 4 . Some entries there are familiar, and some go by other names; these are credited to the party associated to the basic notion. Some notions appear that are not conventionally regarded as secret-sharing, namely, errorcorrecting codes and information dispersal algorithms.
Scheme Π has perfect privacy over A if Adv Figure 4 serves to rigorously define PSS-PR0 (PSS), PSS-PR2, NSS-PR0 (IDA), NSS-PR1, and NSS-PR2: for example, Π is a PSS with respect to A if Π has perfect privacy over A ∩ Priv and perfect recoverability over A ∩ Rec♦.
The remaining seven rows of Figure 4 contain small or Prac, which we haven't yet described. For the statistical notions (small and no Prac) one can introduce a real number in place of small [44] . For example, an -robust PSS-SR1 scheme Π over A has perfect privacy over A and Adv
For the computational goals there are two options. One is to leave the security notion formally undefined but make concretesecurity statements to bound Adv priv Π (A) or Adv rec Π (A) in terms of other quantities. This is the concrete-security approach, and we adopt it for Theorems 1-5.
A different option (which applies to any of the 36 notions) is to move to the asymptotic setting. For this one adds in a security parameter k and interprets small in Figure 4 as negligible and interprets Prac as the class of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms. A secret-sharing scheme now involves n(k) parties and has a message space S(k) ⊆ {0, 1}
* . The Share and Recover algorithms are polynomial-time that take an additional (first) input of 1 k . Adversary A is likewise provided 1 k . Advantage measures Adv priv Π (A) and Adv rec Π (A) of an adversary A become functions of k. Note that in moving to the asymptotic setting we do not use the length of the secret as the security parameter, a questionable definitional choice in some prior treatments.
ACCESS STRUCTURES. We defined secret-sharing goals with respect to an adversary class, but the classical approach is to use an access structure instead. Our approach is more general (and the added generality is needed to encompass contexts like that of McEliece and Sarwate [34] ). An n-party access structure is a set A of subsets of [n] that is monotone: if R ⊆ S ⊆ [n] and R ∈ A then S ∈ A. Each S ∈ A is said to be authorized. The most common access structure is the threshold access structure Am,n where m, n ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ m ≤ n. This is the access structure defined by saying that S ∈ Am,n iff S ⊆ [n] and |S| ≥ m.
We associate to any n-party access structure A two classes of adversaries. The first, A p , is all privacy adversaries A that never corrupt an authorized set (A never corrupts a set S ∈ A). The second, A r , is all recoverability adversaries A that always leave uncorrupted an authorized set (if A corrupts T then [n] \ T ∈ A). 3 In speaking of the players that A can corrupt, we quantify over all possible oracle responses (not necessarily those associated to any particular game). Corrupting i means calling Corrupt(i). The asymmetry embodied in the A p and A r definitions arises because privacy is unachievable if some authorized set of players gets corrupted while robustness is unachievable if no authorized set of players remains uncorrupted.
To access structure A we associate adversary class A p ∪ A r , which we also call A. In this way, any definition over an adversary class provides the corresponding definition over an access structure.
VALID ADVERSARIES. For our robustness results we need a technical condition on the class of adversaries that can be handled. First, say that adversary A ∈ Rec can generate (S, S, T, S , j) if it can call Deal(S), resulting in shares S, corrupt players T ⊆ [n], and output (S , j). We say (S, S, T, S , j) is A-generable if there is an A ∈ A∩Rec such that A can generate (S, S, T, S , j). Now for S , S ∈ ({0, 1}
* ∪ {♦}) n let us say that S ≥ S (S is worse 
We say that A ⊆ Rec is valid (with respect to some secret-sharing scheme Π) if the following is true: if (S, S, T, S , j) is A-generable and S ≥ S then the following adversary A S,T ,S ,j,S is in A: it calls Deal(S); then it calls Corrupt(i) for each i ∈ T (say in numerical order); then it outputs (S , j). Intuitively, if an adversary is allowed to provide a bogus share
* it should be allowed to provide a bogus share
The class A r associated to any access structure A is valid. So too is Am,n,t ∩Rec where Am,n,t [34] 
and At is adversaries that can only output (S , j) with S having at most t non-♦ components. Thus A ∈ Am,n,t is a privacy adversary that can corrupt at most m − 1 players or a recoverability adversary that can corrupt at most n − m players, replacing at most t shares with strings and the rest with ♦.
EXTENSIONS. One can augment a secret-sharing scheme by allowing a Setup algorithm; we would now have a triple of algorithms Π = (Setup, Share, Recover). Setup is probabilistic and outputs a public parameter P ∈ {0, 1} * . Procedures Share and Recover are provided P , as is any adversary attacking the scheme. While Share could always install the public parameter in each player's share, the effect is not the same as adding a Setup: in one setting, the adversary has to corrupt a player to get P and in the other it is free; and there are important efficiency-accounting consequences, as pulling out the public parameter might shorten the shares.
Our privacy and authenticity notions can be lifted to the randomoracle setting [6] . To do so, add to games Priv and Rec a procedure Hash that realizes a random function from strings of arbitrary length to strings of some desired length. Algorithms Share and Recover are allowed to call Hash , as may the adversary itself.
Our notions of privacy and recoverability consider an adversary that can obtain the deal of only one secret. One can easily extend our definitions to handle the sharing of multiple secrets. A standard hybrid argument can be used to show that the two definitions are equivalent (up to a multiplicative factor of the number of secrets dealt). This result depends on the Share algorithm being stateless, as it is for all the schemes of this paper.
THE HK1 PROTOCOL
We reproduce Krawczyk's construction using our notation. Fix a family of adversaries A. We build an n-party secret-sharing scheme with message space S from the five components: (1) SECURITY. Since an encryption key is used by the share algorithm to encrypt just one message, it is natural to think that HK1 is secure if the encryption scheme satisfies one-query indistinguishability (ind1). But we show that the ind1 condition does not guarantee privacy of HK1, even in the random-oracle model. Specifically, we show that even one-time-pad encryption, which is certainly ind1-secure, is not enough. Intuitively, the problem is that the hash function is deterministic -even a random oracle is deterministic in the sense that, when invoked twice on the same input, it returns the same answer both times-and hence the values H [i] computed at line 14 can provide partial information about the key K.
AN ATTACK. We now detail the attack. For concreteness, assume we have n = 3 players and wish to use the 2-out-of-3 threshold scheme, access structure A2,3. Assume the domain of secrets is S = {0, 1} 128 and the domain of messages is the same. In the RO-based construction HK1[Π Enc , Π PSS , Π IDA , Π ECC ] assume we instantiate Π Enc with one-time-pad encryption, C = Encrypt K (X) = K ⊕ X. Assume we instantiate Π PSS with the 2-out-of-3 Shamir secret-sharing scheme over the finite field F 2 128 . Assume we instantiate Π IDA with replication, so Share IDA (C) = (C, C, C). Assume we likewise instantiate Π ECC with replication, so Share ECC (H) = (H, H, H). To understand the attack we first point out that with Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [41] , not only can you reconstruct the key (the secret) from m = 2 out of n = 3 shares, but you can also reconstruct a share (say share 2) given one share (say share 1) and
Hash the underlying key K that was dealt. (This is done by interpolation, in the same manner that the secret is normally recovered.) Specifically, for the 2-out-of-3 scheme there is an algorithm R such that R(K [1] , K) = K[2] for all K ∈ Share PSS (K). We will use this fact to violate privacy. Our adversary A selects any two distinct 128-bit strings, X 0 and X 1 , and calls Deal(X 0 , X 1 ). Let b, K, K, C, H , and X be as specified in game Priv in response to the Deal query. Next, adversary A calls Corrupt(1) to get back X [1] , from which it parses out K[1] and C[1] = C, the latter because the IDA is replication. It now sets
, since the ECC also was replication, which A extracts. So let A return 1 if
and 0 otherwise. One can check that A has advantage 1 − 2 −h (recall that h is output length of Hash ); we omit the details.
One might be tempted to reason that if the HK1 construction is wrong even with a one-time pad and even in the RO model, then certainly it is wrong when any "real" encryption scheme and hashfunction are used, as these will have inferior properties. But this is not the case, as there are ways in which a "real" encryption scheme is superior to a one-time pad that are of relevance here. The attack above used the fact that with a one-time-pad, given a plaintext/ciphertext pair (X, C) one can recover the key K via K = C ⊕ X. Had the encryption scheme been secure against onequery key-recovery (key1), meaning that it was computationally infeasible to find the key from a plaintext/ciphertext pair, we would not have been able to mount the attack. And common encryption schemes like CBC mode do provide security against key recoverability under standard assumptions.
DISCUSSION. The intent of HK1 was to make shares shorter than the secret. This will not happen if one-time-pad encryption is used, leading one to question the practical relevance of the above counterexample and to ask if ind1 security suffices for encryption schemes in which the ratio of message length to key length is always large. We have not been able to resolve the latter question, and, in particular, have found neither a proof nor a counterexample for whether ind1 implies key1 for encryption schemes of the type just mentioned. As for practical relevance, note that a distributed file system should allow the sharing of files of any length, small or large, so security must be provided even for messages shorter than the key. A reasonable encryption scheme could use one-time-pad encryption for short messages and some other form of encryption for longer ones. Indeed, this could be particularly efficient.
PROVING PRIVACY. We now show that ind1 + key1 security is enough to prove the security of HK1, in the RO model, under certain conditions on the access structure. Our result applies to threshold access structures or any other adversary class A where A ∩ Priv = A p m,n . This includes Am,n,t as the distinction between Am,n,t and Am,n vanishes after intersecting with Priv. It is easy to show (removed for reasons of length) that Adv ind Π Enc (B1) and Adv key Π Enc (B2) are small for efficient one-query adversaries B1 and B2 (ind1 + key1 security) if Adv ind Π Enc (B3) is small for any efficient two-query adversary (ind2). We choose to express our result in terms of ind1 + key1 security in order to precisely hone in on what HK2 needs. Note that a PRP-secure blockcipher is ind1 + key1 secure (even though it is not ind2-secure) and therefore an appropriate realization of Π Enc for HK1. Similarly, common modes of operation like CBC are ind1+key1 secure, even for a fixed IV.
THEOREM 1. Let

Proof intuition:
The proof is challenging due to the basic weakness in HK1 exploited in our earlier attack: that the hash function is deterministic and thus may not preserve privacy of the shares to which it is applied. The full proof, which relies on some lemmas concerning PSS privacy, is given in Appendix A.
We begin by highlighting two features of the proof. The first is that it relies not just on the privacy but also the recoverability of Π PSS . (At first glance it is unclear why the privacy of Π should need the recoverability of Π PSS .) The second is that it requires a condition on Π PSS that we call share unpredictability. This condition is not true for an arbitrary access structure. But it is true for threshold access structures and, more generally, for all access structures that are extensible. We define the latter property in Appendix A.
Suppose we aim to construct an adversary B1 attacking the ind1-property of Π Enc . It would run A. The difficulty is that B1 would not know the key K and thus it would be unable to reply to oracle queries of A because these replies are a function of the shares of K. We can, however, consider a new game where the plaintext is encrypted under K but the share vector K is produced from a different key K , expecting this to be perfectly adversarially indistinguishable from the original game due to the privacy of the PSS scheme. It is the determinism of the hash function that causes difficulties in establishing something like this. The problem is in answering a hash query of A that contains the share K[i] of an uncorrupted player i. This is addressed in two steps. The first is to argue that as long as m − 2 or fewer players have been corrupted, the share of an uncorrupted player is unpredictable and thus has low probability of being a Hash query of A. This is true because of the share-unpredictability lemmas, which say that even an adversary knowing the secret and m − 2 or fewer shares cannot predict any remaining share with reasonable advantage. Here the threshold is m, meaning privacy of the secret is guaranteed even if the adversary knows m − 1 shares, but share-unpredictability allows the adversary only m − 2 shares, because we need to assume it might also know the secret. The second step is to argue that if the adversary has corrupted m − 1 players then, if it queries Hash on the share of an uncorrupted player, we have m shares of the secret and, via the Recover procedure of the PSS scheme, can recover the underlying key. This leads to a key-recovery adversary.
We warn that this sketch elides many issues; see Appendix A. 
B) . (2) In both cases the running time A is essentially that of B (see the proof), and A makes at most one query to each of its oracles.
Theorems establishing the necessity of an assumption within some protocol are not common, so let us explain why the theorem above accomplishes this. Suppose you wanted to prove that
achieved the privacy property assuming that Π PSS , Π IDA , and Π ECC are good PSS, IDA, and ECC schemes. The theorem above establishes that, if you make an assumption on Π Enc that doesn't imply ind1+key1 security, you won't be able to get a proof.
RECOVERABILITY. We prove recoverability for any (valid) class of adversaries, which includes the adversaries associated to any access structure, and Am,n,t as well. The proof of the following is in [7] .
THEOREM 3. Let A be a valid class of adversaries and let
with primitives over A, for n parties, and with h-bit hashes. Let A ∈ A be an adversary that asks at mostueries to its Hash oracle. Then Adv
The recoverability of HK1 requires only the collision-intractability of the hash function Hash ; it is possible to restate the theorem above and adjust its proof to show that an attack on the recoverability of HK1 implies an equally effective method to find collisions in Hash . We didn't express the result this way since the proof of privacy was already in the random-oracle model.
THE HK2 PROTOCOL
We now alter HK1 by replacing its deterministic hash function Hash with a randomized commitment scheme. This changes the protocol, as the randomness used in the commitment must be inserted into the shares. We are then able to show that the new protocol, HK2, is a good RCSS under standard assumptions.
COMMITMENT SCHEMES. We formalize a (noninteractive) commitment scheme as a pair Π Com = (Ct, Vf ). Here Ct is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and returns either a pair (Y, R), where Y is the committal and R is the decommittal, or else it returns ⊥. Algorithm Vf is deterministic and, on PROCEDURE Initialize is the set of all M ∈ {0, 1} * such that Ct(M ) is never ⊥. We assume that whether or Ct(M ) is ⊥ is independent of its coin tosses (which ensures that it is easy to check if a point is in the domain).
There are two security properties, hiding and binding, each defined by a game. See Figure 6 . In game Hide, multiple queries to LeftOrRight are allowed, and arguments M0 and M1 to LeftOrRight need not be of equal length. The advantage of A in attacking the hiding-property of the commitment scheme is THE HK2 SCHEME. Fix an adversary class A. We build an n-party secret-sharing scheme with message space S from components: (1) a symmetric encryption scheme Π Enc = (Encrypt, Decrypt) with k-bit keys and a message space S; (2) an n-party PSS Π PSS = (Share PSS , Recover PSS ) over A with message space {0, 1} k ; (3) an n-party IDA Π IDA = (Share IDA , Recover IDA ) over A with message space Σ * ; (4) an n-party ECC Π ECC = (Share ECC , Recover ECC ) over A with message space {0, 1} h ; and (5) a commitment scheme Π Com = (Ct, Vf ) with domain Dom where
Com the underlying primitives of the HK2 scheme, and we say that they are over A, and for n parties. From such a set of primitives we define the secret-sharing scheme
Com ] = (Share, Recover) as specified by Figure 7 . The figure uses the same conventions as those of Figure 5 .
PRIVACY. The difficulty in establishing privacy in the standard model is that our adversary is dynamic, and so we run into the selective-decommitment problem; see Dwork, Naor, and Reingold [18] . One could always pretend the adversary to be static and take a hit of 2 n in the security bound when the adversary is dynamic, but we don't want to do this, as we are interested in concrete security and results with good asymptotic counterparts. Another way around this is to use a statistically-hiding chameleon commitmentscheme. Instead we make do with a weaker requirement, just the statistical hiding. We comment that for the case of static adversaries it would suffice that the commitment be computationally rather than statistically hiding. The proof of the following is in [7] . RECOVERABILITY. We now establish the recoverability of HK2. The theorem applies to any valid adversary class and assumes a weakly-binding committal. The proof is in [7] . REALIZING THE COMMITMENT. Constructions are known for noninteractive, statistically-hiding commitment-schemes that meet the standard binding requirement, and therefore our own. One is based on discrete log [10] , another, on a collision-resistant hashfunction [17, 22] . These constructions are all reasonably efficient. Actually, having relaxed the binding requirement, one can replace the collision-resistant hash-function of the constructions just mentioned with the UOWHF primitive of Naor and Yung [36] . This provides a basis for the plausibility-style result that a one-way function suffices for efficient RCSS [40] 4 , and it also provides the basis for a practical scheme that builds its UOWHF from appropriately keying a cryptographic hash-function.
APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF PRIVACY OF HK1
The definitions and proofs use code-based game playing [4] . To make game descriptions compact, we do not describe each game in full but rather describe all procedures used individually, putting next to their name the games in which they appear. Boxed code in a procedure appears in the game if and only if the game name has a box around it. We begin with some lemmas about the ability to predict shares in a PSS scheme. SHARE PREDICTION LEMMAS. Assuming that a secret is uniformly chosen from a finite set of possible secrets in a PSS scheme, we consider the probability that an adversary predicts the share of an uncorrupted player. Intuitively, we might think this probability is low, and indeed we will see that it is for a threshold access structure. The interesting point is, however, that for some access structures, this probability is not low. We will identify a subclass of access structures for which we can prove that it is low. We fix a PSS scheme Π PSS over access structure A and with (finite) message space S. Consider the games GSh and GSh+ defined via Figure 8 . Both measure the ability of the adversary to predict the share of an uncorrupted player, but in the first game, the adversary does not know the secret, while in the second game, it does.
However, as we now explain, the probability that the adversary wins in game GSh is not always small. It depends on the access structure. Consider for example the access structure A that contains just the sets k . Then an adversary that outputs n, 0 k wins with probability 1. This type of anomaly seems however absent for "natural" access structures, and in particular for the threshold one Am,n. To be general, we define a property of access structures that is sufficient to ensure that the probability of the adversary winning the GSh game is small. We say that A is extendible if for every T ⊆ [n] such that T ∈ A, and every j ∈ T , there exists a T ⊆ [n] such that T ∪T ∈ A but T ∪T ∪{j} ∈ A. That is, T can be extended to an unauthorized subset such that addition of j makes it authorized. We call T an extension of T, j.
Note that the A of our example above is not extendible. Indeed if we set j = n and T = ∅ then T, j has no extension. However, Am,n is extendible, as are many other natural access structures. The following says that the probability of winning GSh is at most 1/|S| if the access structure is extendible. The interesting aspect of the proof is that it relies on the recoverability of the PSS scheme, not just its privacy. The proof is omitted; see the full version of this paper [7] . LEMMA 6. Let Π PSS = (Share PSS , Recover PSS ) be a n-party PSS scheme over message space S and extendible access structure A.
Then for any adversary E we have that Pr GSh
The next lemma bounds the ability of the adversary to predict a share even when it is in possession of the secret. The crucial difference is that in the GSh+ game, the adversary wins only if not just T but T ∪ {j} is not authorized. In the case A = Am,n, this means that we allow it to corrupt only m − 2 players, not m − 1 as in Lemma 6. Intuitively, this says that giving the adversary the secret is like giving it one extra share from the point of view of its ability to predict other shares. The proof is again omitted; see the full version of this paper [7] . LEMMA 7. Let Π PSS = (Share PSS , Recover PSS ) be a n-party PSS scheme over message space S and extendible access structure A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1. We will actually show something stronger than what is claimed in the theorem statement, namely, that the scheme works for any extendible access structure, as defined above.
Then for any adversary F we have that Pr GSh
Figures 9 and 10 describe a total of 10 games, G0-G9. We will be building adversaries that will run A as a subroutine, themselves responding to the latter's oracle queries. Game G0 moves us towards this perspective. (Game G0 is specified by the procedures in the left column of Figure 9 , with the boxed statement included in the Deal procedure.) Our claim is that its left-or-right encryption oracle, getting back a ciphertext C encrypting X c , where c was the random challenge bit underlying its privacy game. It could now use C to construct C and then continue to run A, answering its oracle queries as G0 does, and then A's prediction of whether it is seeing X 0 or X 1 would reveal c to B. However, adversary B can't answer A's oracle queries because they depend on shares of K and B does not have access to K, which is chosen by its privacy game. The obvious way to get around this is to have B pick some new, random K , generate K via Share PSS , and use these, arguing that A will not know the difference due to the privacy of the PSS scheme. So our goal to implement the above idea is to put the game in a form where responding to A's queries is possible without knowing the shares of any authorized subset of players. (For concreteness, consider the case where the access structure is A = Am,n. In this case, we want to be able to respond to A's queries knowing only m − 1 or less shares of K.) We do this in a few steps. Games G0, G1 differ only in statements following the setting of the flag bad, meaning are identical-until-bad in the terminology of [4] , and so by the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing from that paper we have
Consider the experiment in which we pick K, K as in the Initialize procedure of G1. Since the outcome of game G1 is not affected by whether or not the flag bad is set, this means that the problematic IF statement of the Deal procedure can be removed at the cost of a small loss. The Deal procedure of game G2 makes this change. With the goal of making responses to Hash queries possible without having shares of an authorized subset of players, we split the IF statement of the corresponding procedure of game G1 into two parts in game G2.
Now we have
Pr G
the last step again by the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing. The setting of the flag bad by the Hash procedure of G3 does not affect the game outcome and so we have
. Now notice that G4 does not make reference to unopened shares of K. At this point the privacy of the PSS scheme implies
where G5 differs from G4 only in the Initialize procedure which now produces K by sharing not K but an independently and randomly chosen key K . To justify (5) we build an adversary P1 attacking the privacy of Π PSS such that
But the privacy of Π PSS tells us that the advantage of P1 is zero, yielding (5). Adversary P1 begins by picking K and K at random from {0, 1} k and b at random from {0, 1}. It creates n-vector Y to have all components ♦. It then queries K , K to its Deal oracle. We know that the latter creates a share vector K Game G5 uses C, an encryption of X b under K, but makes no other reference to K. This puts us in the position we wanted above where we can use the privacy of Π Enc . Namely, we will now specify B1 so that
Adversary B1 picks K at random and lets K $ ← Share PSS (K ). It creates n-vector Y to have all components ♦. It then runs A. When A makes a query X 0 , X 1 to its Deal oracle, B1 queries X 0 , X 1 to its own left-or-right encryption oracle to get back a ci-
, where b is the challenge bit chosen
Hash The difficult part of the proof is to bound Pr[G A 3 sets bad ]. For this we use the key-recovery security of Π Enc . Let us again try to give some intuition. The difficulty with applying the privacy of the PSS scheme is that A has information about C. Indeed the ECC could be replication, C[i] = C for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so that A would have C after one Corrupt query. If, as in our one-time-pad example, the encryption scheme permitted recovery of the key from a ciphertext, then A could set bad in G3 with high probability. For example, suppose the access structure is Am,n and we are using Shamir's PSS scheme. Adversary A can obtain m − 1 shares of K, use K and these shares to compute an unopened share K[i], and query K[i] C[i] to Hash . But in this case we could obtain K from this last oracle query and the opened shares by using the recovery procedure of the PSS scheme. But we can't apply this strategy if A sets bad after opening m − 2 or fewer shares, but in that case Lemma 7 applies, saying that even though A knows K, it has low probability of predicting an unopened share.
However, in implementing this we face the same difficulties as above. We can't build a key-recovery adversary if it needs to know shares of the challenge key K to simulate A. We want instead to use shares of a different, random K . But for this to be justifiable via the security of the PSS scheme, the game must refer only to opened shares, and G3 does not do this. We now proceed to resolve these problems.
We begin by splitting the bad event into two, one for the case where the set of corrupted players together with the player indicated in the query setting bad do not form an authorized subset, and the other where they do: 
Let us justify this. For each j in the range 1 ≤ j ≤ q we consider the following adversary Fj for the GSh+ game. It gets as input a key K chosen at random from {0, 1} k by the game, and, via Above, by Kj Cj ← x we mean that x is uniquely parsed into its constituents. When A has terminated, algorithm Fj returns Kj and halts. Then 
Now, once again, we have managed to create a game, namely G8, that does not reference any unopened share, and are thus in a position to apply the privacy of Π PSS , which we claim implies
